Hiding in plain sight? Disguised compliance by terrorist offenders. EPC Discussion Paper 09 November 2021. by Paul, Amanda & Acheson, Ian
Credit: MEHDI FEDOUACH / AFP
Ian Acheson 
Amanda Paul






EUROPE IN THE WORLD PROGRAMME
9 NOVEMBER 2021
DISCLAIMER
The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not 
constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot 




Faking it as a means to an end 4
Deception in penal risk management 6
Human limitations 6
Neutrality and assertiveness 6
Guarding against complacency 7
Think outside the box 7




Ian Acheson is a senior advisor 
to the Counter Extremism Project 
and a Visiting Professor at 
Staffordshire University’s School 
of Law, Policing and Forensics.
Amanda Paul is a Senior Policy 




There is growing evidence across Europe that terrorist 
prisoners are successfully deceiving professionals 
concerned with their rehabilitation. This Discussion 
Paper provides recommendations on how this risk can be 
tackled. ‘Disguised compliance’ is complex, controversial 
and still not well understood. Merely complying with 
the generic interventions designed and delivered by 
professionals concerned with their deradicalisation is 
an insufficient response to the supposedly repentant 
prisoner. Many violent extremists have lived a life in 
the shade, evading detection and incarceration. Some 
are adept at countersurveillance and conditioning to 
create and maintain a façade of cooperation – even 
disengagement – that can be lethally misplaced. 
The authors argue for a more assertive and tailored 
approach to establishing the authenticity of terrorist 
prisoners. Furthermore, they highlight some of the ways 
technology and current approaches in other behavioural 
management situations can assist in this endeavour. 
 
The initial findings on disguised compliance reveal an 
under-researched phenomenon where practitioners 
working on the frontline are poorly equipped and 
vulnerable to manipulation. The authors suggest ways 
to improve the authentication process, but the most 
prominent areas of potential gains are in the spheres 
of culture and technology. Practitioners must be better 
directed to develop strong yet sceptical relationships 
with their subjects, based on a rich biographical 
understanding and not merely on passive compliance 
or uncorroborated, untested judgments through generic 
and mechanistic approaches. 
Professional intuition is a necessary but insufficient 
guide to terrorist convicts’ future intentions. There 
is much to be gained from a blended approach that 
includes technology and ‘sense-checking’ by a team of 
practitioners surrounding the individual. This approach 
is more expensive and probably longer-term than the 
standard approach. Nevertheless, the political and 
human price of deceptive terrorists falling through the 
rehabilitation net to harm again is incalculable. 
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Introduction
Deception is implicit in criminal behaviour. It is typically 
a means of creating trust for personal advantage. The 
use of deception by terrorist offenders is unsurprising: 
many have a non-ideological criminal background, where 
deceit and falsehoods were used for tactical advantage.1 
In these cases, deception is observable in the planning of 
acts of violent extremism, during interrogation, or in the 
assessment and treatment for the risky behaviour while 
imprisoned or under other forms of supervision by the 
state upon release. 
For example, over the last few years, several jihadist 
terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by known terrorist 
offenders who deceived professionals involved in their 
risk management into believing that they had been 
successfully rehabilitated. Unlike the thief or the fraudster, 
the consequences of such behaviour can devastate not just 
individual victims but whole communities. 
We call the most dangerous form of this deception 
‘disguised compliance’. Terrorist offenders gain an 
advantage over those who monitor them by acting in  
a superficially compliant way to avoid scrutiny, conceal 
their true intentions and secure benefits that can be 
at odds with public protection. Mere compliance with 
therapeutic programmes is seen too often as an indication 
of progress towards disengagement with terrorist 
ideologies. This is optimism that can be fatally misplaced.  
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Once back on the streets, such individuals can represent 
a significant security threat. On several occasions, people 
who successfully disguised their commitment to terrorism 
went on to perpetrate outrageous terrorist attacks, 
despite being under surveillance in some cases. While 
risk assessment and deradicalisation programmes both 
inside and outside European prisons have made some 
progress over the last few years, there is significant room 
for improvement. Generic, predominantly psychosocial 
interventions delivered by poorly skilled practitioners 
without cultural or religious competence are inherently 
easier to manipulate and ‘game’. It is little wonder that 
deception thrives in these situations. But what more can 
be done to combat this threat? 
Faking it as a means to an end
Take the November 2020 terrorist attack in Vienna as an 
example. Kujtim Fejzulai, an Islamist jihadist, murdered 
4 members of the public in the city centre and injured 
more than 20 others. The Austrian Interior Minister, 
Karl Nehammer, was candid about the catastrophic 
operational failure that led to this bloodbath: “The 
perpetrator managed to fool the de-radicalization 
program of the justice system, to fool the people in it,  
and to get an early release through this”.2 In 2018, 
Fejzulai was convicted of attempting to cross the Turkish 
border into Syria to join the so-called Islamic State. 
Sentenced to 22 months in prison, he was released early 
in December 2019 on the condition that he would be 
regularly monitored by probation services and would 
participate in a deradicalisation programme.3
The November 2019 London Bridge attacker, Usman 
Khan, is a further example. A convicted terrorist, he 
murdered two young people after ‘graduating’ from 
several state deradicalisation programmes with glowing 
endorsements. He successfully disguised how dangerous 
he was to those responsible for monitoring his risk 
in prison and post-release. He was even attending a 
conference for rehabilitated individuals on the day of 
the attack, where he deliberately targeted those who had 
been assisting his reintegration. While Khan was released 
with 16 separate licence conditions and the highest level 
of multiagency public protection arrangements, he still 
managed to create a positive and enduring image of a 
reformed citizen in the minds of those who worked with 
him. This undoubtedly had an impact on decisions to 
allow him to travel to and attend the public function 
unsupervised, despite still being regarded as high-risk. 
Indeed, a UK inquest into his victims’ deaths in April 2021 
reveals that while in prison, Khan was one of the main 
extremists responsible for radicalising others in his wing.4
Convicted terrorist Sudesh Amman was also under 
special police surveillance when he stabbed two people in 
Streatham, London in February 2020. Released from prison 
a week earlier, after serving part of a three-year sentence 
for terrorist-related activities, he was also deemed a 
sufficiently high risk to require close monitoring.5 
Kahn and Amman were automatically released at 
the halfway point of their sentences, without any 
involvement of the UK parole board. This is significant. 
The board’s function is to assess whether certain types 
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of serious offenders are safe to be released into the 
community. Its role is to examine the prisoner’s custodial 
performance against rehabilitation targets, including 
assessing whether there has been an authentic and 
acceptable reduction in dangerousness. In this respect, 
it is specifically interested in false compliance.6 The fact 
that automatic release applied even in cases where an 
offender continued to display concerning behaviour led 
to an urgent review of the licence conditions of terrorist 
offenders. As a result, England and Wales enacted a law 
prohibiting the early release of terrorists.7
When it comes to non-Islamist terrorism, there are fewer 
examples of deception. And where they do emerge, such 
as in the case of the Christchurch extremist Brenton 
Tarrant, it is often related to a simple but devastating 
lapse in professional curiosity. In this case, the police’s 
failure to properly scrutinise his firearms application 
and seek proper references led to the assailant easily 
circumventing screening processes to be in possession 
of several semiautomatic weapons, which he used to 
devastating effect. 
Moreover, many violent extremists, particularly 
hardcore jihadists, often view incarceration as a test 
of their commitment to their cause and, potentially, 
an opportunity to continue their jihad. During their 
sentence, they look for ways to convince those with 
whom they interact (e.g. prison officers, social workers, 
psychologists, supervisors) that they have understood 
the error of their ways and have turned over a new leaf to 
speed up their release. In some cases, jihadists have opted 
to study psychology. While on the surface, this could 
be perceived as a positive step forward, experts allege 
that in many cases, they use what they learn to better 
manipulate the work of prison therapists.8 
Many violent extremists, particularly 
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to continue their jihad.
 
 
Compared with non-ideological criminals or sex offenders, 
a significantly lower proportion of terrorist offenders 
are reconvicted of extremism crimes.9 However, this is 
not necessarily a result of state intervention, and the 
rates vary widely across the world. It is possible to exist 
peacefully in society while remaining deeply committed 
to a violent extremist worldview. Authorities cannot 
simply reverse the process of radicalisation. It must be a 
voluntary act taken by the radicalised themselves. 
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Convincing terrorists that their long-held beliefs are 
wrong or warped is not straightforward. Offenders must 
voluntarily accept this themselves. As such, it is almost 
impossible to know definitively whether an individual is 
effectively rehabilitated and disengaged and thereby has 
a more favourable attitude to society. Only they hold  
that information.
Nevertheless, the formal assessment and management 
of risk in often sophisticated violent extremist offenders 
are crucially important. They can have a major impact 
on release arrangements, including decisions relating to 
early release, and levels of surveillance and controls over 
communication, association, location and movement. 
During the last few years, a significant number of risk 
assessment tools have been developed, including the 
Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Finland), Extremism Risk Guidelines 
(the UK) and RADAR-iTE (Germany).10 Using varying 
methodologies, these instruments assess the likelihood 
of an individual threatening public security. This is done 
via professional judgments using a set of risk indicators 
that examine identity and ideology. Yet despite these 
relatively new and ever-evolving tools, understanding 
whether a terrorist offender has truly abandoned his 
toxic worldview and is not simply faking it can be near 
impossible to determine. The metric of authenticity, 
which is key to anticipating future threats posed by 
ideological offenders, is often conspicuously absent in 
such mechanistic approaches.
6
Deception in penal risk management
Prisons are places where power, control and space 
are regularly contested between the state and 
those incarcerated, whatever their crimes. This is a 
phenomenon that transcends the modern problem of 
terrorism. The legitimacy of the state and its institutions 
is central to the contemporary challenge of deception  
in risk management.  
The legitimacy of the state and  
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deception in risk management.
Current theory and practice concerned with disguised 
compliance is mainly located in social work and non-
terrorist forensic psychology. Dealing with discerning 
the true intentions of those deemed a physical and/
or sexual risk to others, both disciplines may assist in 
counterterrorism policy development. However, it would 
be unwise to reach for too many similarities between such 
disparate groups of offenders.
The forms of subversion encountered by these social 
workers and/or non-terrorist forensic psychologists are 
typically limited to deception to achieve personal goals. 
The sex offender may seek to deceive therapists who 
regulate his ability, to have the freedom to access more 
victims. Ideologically motivated offenders may well use 
the same techniques to declare their disengagement from 
toxic beliefs to which they are actually still committed. 
In the case of Islamist extremism, some scholars argue 
that dissimulation is not simply a pragmatic response 
but a divine obligation mandated in theology.11 Others 
condemn this view as a malign misrepresentation of a 
doctrine that historically allowed persecuted Muslims 
to deny their faith to survive.12 Nonetheless, as many 
terrorist acts depend on long-term deception, terrorist 
convicts under extreme surveillance likely have a 
particular predisposition to conceal their intent. Many 
terrorists incarcerated for very long periods with little  
to do become adept at countersurveillance and react to 
their environment accordingly. This has been observed  
in prisons across the world.13 
Human limitations
People are not very efficient lie detectors. Multiple 
studies show that we lack a reliable set of skills and cues 
to tell when we are being deceived.14 Even professionals 
have only slightly better track records in detecting false 
compliance than equal chance. This is often because 
they rely on inaccurate beliefs about what constitutes 
deception. Uncovering insincerity is difficult at the best 
of times. With terrorist offenders operating in tightly 
knit prison communities that are often hard to penetrate 
– keenly aware that they are constantly monitored and 
holding a worldview built on paranoia and resistance –, 
this arduous task is made even more complex. 
Moreover, the professionals charged with risk 
management often come from profoundly different 
cultural backgrounds than their clientele and operate 
screening systems and interventions which reward mere 
compliance as a measure of improvement. Complying 
with terrorist treatment programmes does not equal 
successful rehabilitation. And yet, some of the most high-
profile deradicalisation programmes, such as the UK’s 
Healthy Identity Intervention, judge success on levels 
of positivity in participation, as opposed to levels of 
measurable authentic change.15
Neutrality and assertiveness
The value of the collaborative approach between 
therapists and patients is in such ascendancy in the 
relatively new ‘science’ of deradicalisation that it risks 
taking the form of an unquestioned orthodoxy. In 
this way, risk assessment and management tools and 
counter-extremism interventions are built around a joint 
enterprise between therapist and patient. While it is 
hard to imagine how a non-voluntary alternative could 
work, the collaborative therapeutic approach is rooted 
in interventions for prisoners who are not ideologically 
motivated. Certainly, there is plenty of evidence to 
support the idea that a coercive, aggressive or shaming 
approach to behavioural change does not work in other 
groups likely to use deception in therapeutic encounters, 
such as drunk drivers.16
However, neutrality and the absence of assertive 
challenges to the tactics employed by deceptive terrorists 
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Guarding against complacency
As mentioned earlier, the numbers of terrorist 
offenders in prison populations are still relatively small 
across Europe. Much is also made of the risk of their 
reconviction being significantly less than non-terrorist 
prisoners. Some studies put the reconviction rates of 
terrorist offenders as low as 5%, compared with 45% for 
the rest of the prison population.17 
The combination of these low numbers coupled with 
traditional underinvestment in penal institutions has 
not helped to stimulate thinking or improvement in 
how we identify and defeat disguised compliance. Bilal 
Taghi, sentenced to 28 years for the attempted murder of 
two French prison officers in 2016, boasted in court that 
he had deliberately lowered the guard of his targets by 
appearing to be a model prisoner who was approachable 
and ‘chatty’. In the UK’s highest-security prison, HM 
Prison Whitemoor, in 2020, a prison officer was nearly 
murdered by two radicalised assailants dressed in fake 
suicide belts. Two days prior, a prison psychologist 
discussed the possibility of awarding one of the assailants 
with a certificate of achievement for his participation 
in a deradicalisation course. The stakes of disguised 
compliance remain extremely high.
Think outside the box
The vulnerability of the relationship between 
rehabilitation practitioner and terrorist offender 
subjected to risk management suggests that a 
multidisciplinary approach that balances positive trust-
building with regular integrity checks is likely better than 
the more orthodox, therapeutic relationship based on 
exclusivity.18 Moreover, in one-on-one encounters, the 
‘failure’ of the subject may be perceived as the ‘failure’ 
of the therapist, and so the possibility of inadvertent 
collusion in disguised compliance is magnified. Some 
psychological features of offenders may predispose 
them to greater levels of deception. They include a high 
tolerance for ambiguity, meaning the ability to flex their 
outward appearance and views to conceal their true 
intentions. In other words, to be a good actor. 
Mental health screening will be  
important in building the right  
approach to detecting deception.
Mental health screening will be important in building 
the right approach to detecting deception. Mutual 
radicalisation by opposing ideological groups across the 
religious and/or political spectrum of violent extremism 
ratchets up perceptions of threat as factions seek to 
exploit the fears and prejudices of vulnerable people. This 
can mean some offenders being hyper-vigilant as factors 
on either side of the prison walls increase paranoia and 
hatred. Such entrenched perceptions may well have a 
bearing on levels of disguised compliance in treatment 
where vulnerability is associated with weakness and 
where fleeting encounters with therapists fail to mitigate 
the lived reality of the offender as he returns to his 
comrades in the prison wing and the pressures of prison 
life. There is a consensus that detailed biographical 
knowledge of terrorist prisoners from early life onwards is 
essential to detecting insincerity.
Differences in extremists’ ideological motivations within 
and between groups necessitate a calibrated approach 
in therapeutic interventions. In turn, it can assist with 
controlling false compliance as therapies evolve from 
generic to individualised ‘doses’ that treat the pathology 
of the offender according to his criminogenic factors. 
For example, extensive research into one offender might 
should not simply be accepted as the ‘industry standard’ 
for those charged with deciding who is safe and who is 
not. The stakes are far too high for a failure in identifying 
those still wedded to violent extremism. Moreover, violent 
extremists’ short-term exposure to therapists – often 
a moral universe away from their subjects – seems an 
unlikely way to foster an authentic and sustainable new 
identity in environments as fragile and abnormal as 
prisons. These complexities and risks suggest an approach 
that should be longer, more individualised, more intrusive 
and more sceptical than the current fashion for short-
term metered ‘doses’ of generic intervention.
 
The stakes are far too high for a  
failure in identifying those still  
wedded to violent extremism.
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indicate a theological and substance misuse approach, 
while another might require psychological and family 
therapy. Research by criminologist Sagit Yehoshua 
distinguishes between offenders who commit terrorist 
acts for predominantly ideological reasons and those 
whose motivation is internalised and personal.19 This 
has significant implications for how compliance and true 
intent is assessed and tested.
Despite the currently small numbers, with increasing 
populations of terrorist offenders in Europe and the 
US comes the potential for more risky offenders to be 
added to this mix as repatriated foreign terrorist fighters. 
Therapeutic interventions for this latter ‘unknown 
quantity’ group must also be developed to manage  
public safety. 
The successful reintegration of all terrorist offenders 
into society post-release also depends on our ability 
to grasp an authentic picture of their hopes, fears and 
risks. To that end, host communities can play a vital 
role as an adjunct to necessary state surveillance, 
keeping offenders committed to disengagement and 
alerting authorities if they perceive deception. There 
is repeated evidence of terrorist offenders across the 
ideological spectrum who deceive those nearest to 
them of their intentions successfully. While broader 
community support is not a substitute for professional 
risk management, it remains, in the UK at least, an 
underutilised asset that should be mobilised to help 
protect national security. 
Therapeutic inquiry differs from the interrogation 
techniques that might have put terrorist offenders in 
front of their therapists in the first place. Nonetheless, 
we can still draw some useful information from the 
police interview process. Interrogators who rely on 
passive observation are less likely to detect deception 
than those who adopt a more assertive approach. This 
includes strategies designed to exploit the cognitive 
‘load’ of false compliance – lying is a mentally taxing 
task.20 Intensifying that burden by withholding 
information and testing it against the suspect’s account 
is a common instance of this type of strategy. Another 
approach is to test a detailed biographical knowledge of 
the offender for inconsistencies. There are limits to such 
interrogation innovations, principally that the offenders’ 
trust can be misplaced or manipulated, and the obvious 
disbenefits of an oppressive approach. Relationship-
building in a therapeutic environment is, in the end, 
more fruitful than the oft-confrontational aspects 
of criminal interrogation. However, the therapeutic 
relationship must then be authentic. 
The benefits of assistive technology  
to detecting deception have not been  
fully exploited.
The benefits of assistive technology to detecting 
deception have not been fully exploited. While the 
effectiveness of polygraphs is still fiercely contested, 
these views are often rooted in outdated perceptions 
rather than the recognition of an increasingly 
sophisticated approach that, for example, combines 
artificial intelligence (AI) with new innovations.21 These 
include voice and speech pattern and involuntary muscle 
movement analyses. Research into the biodata generated 
by deceptive people is still in its infancy but is growing 
fast. Moreover, advanced wearable technology, such as 
electronic and satellite ‘tagging’ bracelets that could also 
communicate other data that measures physiological 
changes in real time (e.g. heart rate, drug and alcohol 
consumption),22 may feature in early warning systems of 
risky behaviour. Increasingly cheap and sophisticated, 
this technology could also play a role in corroborating  
or disproving offenders’ accounts of their whereabouts 
and behaviour when remotely supervised in the 
community, thus testing their sincerity and deception 
and aiding desistance.
Conclusion and recommendations
At a European Policy Centre–Counter Extremist Project 
(CEP) Expert Workshop on disguised compliance in 
February 2021, several encouraging areas for exploration 
were revealed. Based on the evidence gathered from the 
expert panel and other sources, including interviews with 
experts in the field, the authors draw up the following 
recommendations to reduce the possibility of deceit 
by terrorist offenders. These are preliminary views and 
will inform a larger piece of research by the CEP and 




An executive, multidisciplinary agency that 
coordinates the risk management of terrorism-related 
prisoners is likely to be more effective than the current 
multiagency approach. In many jurisdictions, the 
burden of terrorist risk management is shared between 
agencies with different philosophical and organisational 
structures that operate at different points in the journey, 
with different personnel who have different resources 
and objectives.23 As the terrorist offender travels 
through the prison system and back into society,  
this inherent dysfunctionality magnifies the prospect  
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of a dangerous individual ‘falling through the net’.  
Case in point, this phenomenon is revealed in the 
coroner’s inquest into Usman Khan.24 
One unified, multidisciplinary team with executive 
authority would better ensure coherence and continuity 
in offender risk management, thereby reducing handovers 
and rationalising the dangerous sprawl of the terrorist 
offender threat response. These new arrangements, 
combining stable and long-term relationship-building 
with assertive intervention, would make disguised 
compliance harder to sustain.
RECOMMENDATION 2
A blended therapy approach that utilises a diversity 
of technology and involves different professionals 
around a lead caseworker is the best approach to 
detecting deception in terrorist offenders. Collusive 
and collaborative approaches should be blended with 
assertive challenge informed by professional scepticism 
and augmented by regular authenticity monitoring. For 
example, integrity testing has been used in the human 
resources industry for over half a century.25 Some of these 
techniques may be adapted for terrorist offenders to help 
establish the true extent of their behavioural change. An 
interventionist model must replace the passive approach 
to managing risks activated by poor behaviour.
RECOMMENDATION 3
Carefully controlled therapeutic encounters between 
opposing ideological extremist groups should at least be 
considered as a means of reducing the distant ‘mutual 
radicalisation’ that entrenches and hardens belief 
systems. Although highly controversial, this approach 
could challenge false narratives, humanise outgroups 
and police deception. The dynamics of violent extremism 
change all the time. We must not be afraid to contemplate 
new ways of responding to it.
RECOMMENDATION 4
The utility of assistive technology, such as lie 
detectors, AI and other means of collecting biodata, 
should be thoroughly investigated to enhance public 
safety. It would help distinguish between offenders who 
model socially desirable behaviour to conceal their true 
intent and those who have authentically disengaged from 
toxic ideologies.
RECOMMENDATION 5
More research into the ‘countermeasures’ used by 
terrorists to defeat forms of authenticity testing should 
be conducted. This would include against polygraph 
testing, which is due to be used on convicted terrorists in 
the UK following legislative reforms and which has been 
trialled in some EU border countries.26 
RECOMMENDATION 6
Individualised approaches should replace generic 
rehabilitation programmes. The pathways into – and, 
therefore, out of – violent extremism can vary greatly. 
More tailormade, holistic treatment programmes, 
based on rich biographical understanding of offenders’ 
trajectory into a terrorist mindset, are needed to help 
uncover insincerity. While this is a difficult and inevitably 
more expensive and time-consuming approach, 
multifaceted interventions that focus on features of 
psychology, theology, social drives and more will reveal 
information that is useful in combatting deception. 
RECOMMENDATION 7
Ideologically motivated prisoners involved in risk 
assessment programmes must have minimised contact, 
as there is evidence that they can learn from those who 
know how to ‘game the system’ to progress, without any 
real disengagement, through custody and back out into 
the community. 
RECOMMENDATION 8
European member states should follow the UK and  
end the automatic early release of terrorist offenders, 
particularly where their risk exceeds a public protection 
threshold.
RECOMMENDATION 9
Preventative custodial measures for terrorist offenders 
who have served their prison sentence but are still 
considered to be radicalised and, therefore, a threat to 
public safety and/or national security should be assessed 
further. Preventative detention is clearly controversial as 
it engages debate about human rights and legitimacy, but 
it must not be off the table, either. People whose risk and 
behaviours fall below a criminal threshold but are still 
clearly dangerous have considerable potential for harm. 
RECOMMENDATION 10
The successes and failures of public risk management 
in related areas must continue to be shared and 
learned. These include therapeutic interventions for sex 
offenders or people with personality disorders. Many 
professionals in such areas share common challenges 
and have developed strategies that remain located in 
their individual practice. Assimilating best practice 
across agencies that deal with deception routinely is an 
important task. There is currently no multidisciplinary 
forum for practitioners to share challenges and solutions 
– this should be investigated. The EU’s Radicalisation 




Community supervision programmes should be 
assessed extensively to better understand their 
strengths and weaknesses in preventing terrorists from 
re-engaging with extremist ideology and carrying out 
terrorist attacks. Pilot schemes that place trusted and 
influential community representatives who are well 
placed to test commitment to non-violent futures at  
the heart of reintegration and safety surveillance should 
be encouraged. 
RECOMMENDATION 12
Prisons should be surveilled more assertively, with 
better-integrated data collection to uncover discrepancies 
between what violent extremists tell prison staff and 
their true intentions. This might include creating or 
expanding the recruitment of covert human assets to 
carry out authenticity tests. Prison surveillance must be 
intelligence- as well as behaviour-led.
RECOMMENDATION 13
Diverse forms of activity for offenders that help build a 
picture of intent but are not directly or obviously related 
to interventions specifically designed to combat violent 
extremism should be encouraged. This particularly applies 
to wider educational participation that might provide 
valuable additional context about an offender’s mindset, 
worldview, psychological stability, capacity for change 
and future intent. This has the additional benefit of 
broadening the offender’s engagement with the world and 
so providing more possibilities for reflection and change. 
Terrorists who deceive those trying to manage their safety 
in prisons and future social integration pose a lethal 
threat. Their actions are societally destructive, sometimes 
out of all proportion to the relatively small number of 
innocent victims they create. If professionals working in 
the field of violent extremism understand this complexity, 
it is also understood by the terrorists they oppose, many 
of whom have achieved ‘spectaculars’ through at least 
some degree of false compliance and deception.  
Terrorists’ actions are societally 
destructive, sometimes out of all 
proportion to the relatively small number 
of innocent victims they create.
Determining who is sincere about abandoning ideological 
terror and who is not is profoundly difficult. We could 
never be totally safe from sophisticated and determined 
terrorists without surrendering the very liberties that 
define us – and so doing their work for them. However, 
the authors believe that our ability to identify and control 
such threats can be vastly improved. The research on 
deceit and detection is still in its early stages. We must 
continue this discussion with pace and rigour. 
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